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Supply-Side Fallacy. Rubbish Economics In The White 
House 
 
By Sven Brendel 
 
Summary 
 
Since the early 1980s Supply-side economics, the idea that cutting the taxes 
of the rich will generate sufficient economic growth to off-set the cost of tax-
cuts and increase government revenue, has been at the heart of the political 
right’s economic agenda despite having failed in practice. The idea relies on 
the erroneous concept that the relationship between tax revenue, economic 
growth and tax rates is represented by a simple bell curve, according to 
which neither a tax rate of 0% nor of 100% will produce any revenue. Such 
is not the case, however, as a tax rate of 100% will yield revenue. The most 
efficient tax rate depends upon the usage of tax funds, which can increase or 
decrease the economy’s tolerance for a given tax rate. It is vital that the 
American people stop supply-side economics, join America’s economists, 
and help reduce income inequality, balance the budget and provide the gov-
ernment with needed funds for investment in social services and infrastruc-
ture. 
 
Imagine a theory that defies common 
sense and is decried by experts in the field 
as laughable. Imagine this theory becom-
ing policy and failing miserably, produc-
ing none of its promised outcomes. After 
being put aside as a failed experiment for 
eight years, imagine this theory being rein-
stated as policy, producing nothing but the 
negative side effects it produced a decade 
earlier. Voila: Supply-side economics and 
the political right. Supply-side economics, 
once more popularly known as Reaganom-
ics, rests on the assumption that lowering 
the tax rates of the rich will spur economic 
growth and, therefore, increase govern-
ment revenue. Since the early 1980s, sup-
ply-side economics has become part of the 
GOP dogma. Support for a Republican 
president has come to coincide with sup-
port of Reaganomics, giving seemingly 
endless tax cuts to the rich, who are al-
ready pulling far ahead of everyone else. 
Most economists, however, continue to 
regard cutting the taxes of the rich in order 
to increase revenue as a rubbish theory. 
Even George Bush Sr. had the good sense 
to greet Reagan’s supply-side theory as 
“voodoo economics” when first con-
fronted with it (though he miraculously 
changed his mind after being offered the 
vice presidency). According to the late 
Nobel price laureate and Harvard econom-
ics professor James Tobin, “... [The] idea 
that tax cuts would actually increase reve-
nues turned out to deserve the ridicule 
with which sober economists had greeted 
it in 1981.” Supply-side economics has 
failed to create the tremendous economic 
growth it promised. Instead, it has in-
creased income inequality and lead to the 
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creation of the most massive budget defi-
cits in American history (Tobin, 1992).  
Supply-side economics is a failure. In 
2008, the American people will have the 
chance to stop supply-side economics 
from wreaking further havoc on our politi-
cal-economy by denouncing the political 
right. 
Supply-side economics is based on the 
“Laffer Curve,” named after its creator, 
Arthur Laffer. In 1972 after leaving his 
government position in disgrace for 
grossly miscalculating the gross domestic 
product, Laffer together with his long time 
friend and protégé Jude Wanninski intro-
duced the United States to the Laffer 
Curve. The curve stipulates that at a tax 
rate of zero, government would receive no 
revenue as no taxes would be collected. At 
a tax rate of 100% government would not 
receive any revenue either, since such high 
taxes would exterminate all capitalistic 
incentives and bring economic develop-
ment to a standstill. (Later-on Laffer 
would show this curve to Dick Cheney, 
then serving as Chief of Staff for President 
Gerald Ford. After having the curve drawn 
on a cocktail napkin in front of him, 
“...there were a few points Cheney might 
have made in response... he could have 
noted that the Laffer Curve was not, 
strictly speaking, correct” (Chait, 2007a p. 
15).) (this information is a little vague, I 
don’t really see where the author was go-
ing with it) 
As one might expect, the curve repre-
sents an extreme over-simplification; a 
flawed theory that will inevitably lead to 
flawed policy. While it is true that exces-
sively high tax rates can dampen, though 
not completely stop economic growth. The 
relationship between the top marginal tax 
rate, the percent of taxes paid by the rich, 
and economic growth is weaker and far 
more complex than Laffer assumed. It is 
possible to derive revenue at a 100% tax 
rate. The Soviet Union, while certainly not 
an example for economic policy was able 
to sustain one of the world’s largest mili-
tary apparatuses, exercise political domi-
nance over Eastern Europe, and keep the 
entire world in a state of anxiety with 
revenues derived from a 100% tax rate 
(Chait, 2007a). Moreover, there is no indi-
cation that the U.S. is approaching the 
point where cutting taxes might increase 
revenue. The relationship between gov-
ernment revenue, economic growth and 
the tax rate is dependent upon the usage of 
tax funds. There is no static peak at which 
the tax rate maximizes government reve-
nue: if tax funds are used as investments in 
societal welfare, through spending social 
services and infrastructure, the economy 
will be able to tolerate, even benefit from 
higher tax rates (Besci, 2000). The Laffer 
curve ignores all of the above; its propo-
nents remain under the erroneous impres-
sion that the U.S. must cut taxes in order 
to increase government revenue. 
Not surprisingly, the theory that reduc-
ing the tax burden of the rich stimulates 
the economy “has been proven false by 
experience” (Tobin, 1992). While the top 
marginal tax rate has the ability to dampen 
economic growth, the relationship between 
the top marginal tax rate and economic 
growth over the course of the second half 
of the twentieth century suggests that the 
former has little effect on the latter. Dur-
ing the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s America’s 
top marginal tax rate was set at, or in ex-
cess of 70%. Yet the economy prospered. 
In the 1980s, the Reagan administration 
introduced supply-side economics and 
slashed the top tax rate by 60%, from 70% 
to 28% (Wilson, 2002). Yet, real GDP 
growth and median income increases re-
mained well below the levels experienced 
in the 1950s, 60s and 70s (U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce, 2007 & U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2006a). In the 1990s, the economy 
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grew enormously despite a tax hike, while 
remaining unaffected by the Bush tax cuts. 
The only significant effects supply-side 
economics has had on American society 
are an increase in social injustice, chronic 
lack of government revenue, and the re-
sulting budget deficits. Today, the U.S. 
government is faced with the largest 
budget deficit in U.S. history, and the 
American people are increasingly divided 
along economic fault lines that threaten 
the health and stability of our society. 
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Figure 1. The top marginal tax rate (pink line with percentages on left y axis) has seems 
to have little effect on annual nominal GDP growth (blue line with percentages on right y 
axis).
 
Between 1950 and 1980 the U.S. enjoyed 
“a massive boom, fueling rapid growth in 
living standards across the board” (Chait, 
2007a). Hamilton College sociologist 
Dennis Gilbert (1998) refers to the time 
span between 1946 and 1975 as “the Age 
of Shared Prosperity” (p. 19). Median in-
come levels increased substantially, the 
economy showed strong growth and pov-
erty declined. Quarterly growth of the U.S. 
gross domestic product (GDP) averaged 
1.25%, compared to an average of 1% dur-
ing the 1980s, and 0.5% since 2000 (U.S. 
Department of Commerce, 2007). Be-
tween 1955 and 1979, the median earnings 
of full-time year round workers increased 
by an inflation adjusted 66%, from 
$26,000 to $44,000, for men and by 56%, 
from $17,000 to $26,000, for women (U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2006a). The percentage of 
individuals below the federal poverty 
threshold fell from 22.9% in 1959 to 
11.7% in 1979 (U.S. Census Bureau, 
2007b). These increases in economic 
prosperity remain unparalleled. Since 
1979, the median income for fully em-
ployed men has remained stagnant, as 
have poverty rates. (U.S. Bureau, 2007b). 
Following the Korean War, the United 
States pioneered mass-affluence and be-
came the first society in the history of hu-
mankind where the majority of citizens are 
not members of an economically disadvan-
taged proletariat (Sachs, 2005). This un-
precedented event: the emergence of a so-
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ciety in which the privileged outnumber 
the unprivileged, took place despite a top 
marginal tax rate in excess of 70%. 
Decreasing the top marginal tax rate has, 
however, increased social injustice signifi-
cantly. During the same time that the tax 
burden has shrunk, income inequality has 
skyrocketed, reaching levels not seen since 
the pre-depression era (Johnston, 2007). 
Between 1979 and 2004, “the average af-
ter-tax income of the top one percent of 
the population nearly tripled, rising from 
$314,000 to nearly $868,000 — for a total 
increase of $554,000.” During this time 
span, the top 1% has left even the upper 
quintile behind. Average net income in-
creased 176% for the top 1%, compared to 
69% for the top quintile, 29% for fourth 
quintile, 21% for the middle quintile, 17% 
for the second quintile and a mere 6% for 
the bottom quintile, respectively. Accord-
ing to these figures, the average income of 
the top percentile has increased 167% as 
fast as that of the top 20% overall. The 
share of income earned by the top 1% has 
doubled, from earning 7.5% to 14% of all 
income (Aviva & Sherman, 2007).  
America has even surpassed ancient 
Rome in terms of income inequality. In 
2005, the share of income earned by the 
top 1/10,000 of Americans (3%) was three 
times as large as the share of income 
earned by the top 1/10,000 in the Roman 
Empire (1%) in 14 A.C.E (Chait, 2007a). 
Supply-side economics has been one of 
the driving forces behind the rising ine-
quality with “Direct estimates by the Ur-
ban Institute-Brookings Institution Tax 
Policy Center… [providing] definitive 
evidence that… tax cuts have widened in-
come inequality” (Aviva & Sherman, 
2007). 
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Figure 2. The top 1% has received far larger inflation adjusted income gains since 1979 
than any other demographic. 
 
Not suprisingly, most economists see in-
come inequality as a grave problem, and 
have been alienated by the supply-side 
dogma of the political right. A recent sur-
vey by the Southern Economic Journal 
found that 71% of American economists 
believe that income disparities in the U.S. 
have grown too large and over 80% be-
lieve that it is the role of government to 
redistribute income. Economists have 
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abandoned the Republican Party along 
with the political right. Nearly two thirds 
of economists identify themselves as pro-
gressive with less than 20% identifying 
themselves as conservative. Democrats 
outnumber Republicans almost three to 
one among members of the profession 
(Klein, 2004). Even Alan Greenspan, one 
of the relatively few conservative Ameri-
can economists, stated that income ine-
quality is “not the type of thing which a 
democratic society—a capitalist democ-
ratic society—can really accept without 
addressing” (Greenspan in Pizzigati, 
2005). In the community of American 
economists, supply-siders represent little 
more than “a tiny coterie of right-wing 
economic extremists” (Chait, 2007a, p. 1). 
In order to convince the public that in-
come inequality is not as grave a problem 
as it actually is, conservatives commonly 
put the top 1% together with the rest of the 
top quintile. In a  response to a statement 
by John Edwards that the U.S. is becoming 
a country divided between “haves” and 
“have-nots,” the conservative Heritage 
Foundation published “Two Americas: 
One Rich, One Poor? Understanding In-
come Inequality in the United States.” In 
this article, Robert Rector and Rea 
Hederman Jr. (2004) use the household 
income quintiles to argue that income ine-
quality is not as great as it seems and well 
justified in its extent. They argue that 
households in the top fifth are larger with 
more income earners who work harder and 
are better educated; thus, they are in need 
and deserving of higher incomes. House-
holds in the lower two quintiles, on the 
other hand, tend to be smaller with fewer 
income earners who are less educated and 
less productive.  Furthermore, differences 
in household income between the quintiles 
may be off-set by differences in household 
size. After all, a household of two making 
$75,000 annually may very well have a 
higher standard of living than a family 
four making $120,000 (Hederman & Rec-
tor, 2004). 
The observations made by Rector and 
Hederman are correct, but irrelevant. Of 
households in the top quintile – those with 
incomes exceeding $84,000 in 2004 – 76% 
had two or more income earners, 62% of 
householders were college graduates and 
82% had some college education, com-
pared to 42%, 27% and 55% among the 
general public, respectively (see figure 3). 
Almost three quarters, 73%, took less than 
two weeks of vacation per year (U.S. Cen-
sus Bureau, 2006c), performing one third 
of all labor in the U.S. After adjusting the 
disparity between the top and bottom quin-
tile for size, taxes and government trans-
fers, Rector and Hederman conclude that 
“the top fifth of the population has $4.21 
of income for every $1.00 at the bottom” 
rather than “$14.30 of income for every 
$1.00 at the bottom.” While they have 
proven that the disparity between the top 
and bottom quintiles does not constitute 
great social injustice, they have not ad-
dressed the gaping canyon of inequality 
that is forming between the top 1% and 
everyone else. They have failed to address 
how supply-side economics is causing the 
very rich to pull far ahead of hard-working 
middle and upper-middle class individuals 
in the top quintile. Individuals who do pay 
their fair share in taxes. The effect of sup-
ply-side economics has not manifested it-
self in the disparities between the top and 
bottom fifth – the working poor and the 
middle class, but in the gaping hole be-
tween the very rich and everyone else. 
  
Even though, it is difficult for individu-
als to realize that they are being left-
behind by the rich, so long as they too ex-
perience increases in their absolute stan-
dard of living (i.e. an overall increase in 
their household income – even if they still 
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fall short of keeping up with the top), more 
and more Americans are taking note of the 
large inequalities that are now dividing our 
nation. According to a 2007 study by the 
Pew Research Center, “over the past two 
decades, a growing share of the public has 
come to the view that American society is 
divided into two groups, the ‘haves’ and 
the ‘have-nots.’” For the first time in 
twenty years as many Americans now see 
the U.S. as a divided nation (48%) as those 
who do not (48%). 
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Figure 3. Percent of households and householders with selected characteristics in each income 
quintile and top 5% (U.S. Census Bureau, 2006c). 
 
These findings mark a strong departure 
from public sentiment of the 1980s, when 
Americans overwhelmingly rejected the 
notion of a divided society. Since 1988 the 
percentage of those who see the U.S. di-
vided has increased by 84%, from 26% to 
48%. (Allen, 2007) The increasing income 
gaps have dampened Americans’ overall 
view of the economy as well. In 2006, 
only 34% saw the economy as being in 
“excellent/good shape.” Even among 
members of the upper quartile, households 
earning more than $75,000, only 41% saw 
the economy as being in good shape (see 
figure 4). While “macro-indicators are 
generally reassuring,” with low inflation, 
robust growth and increased productivity, 
the confidence of the 1990s is gone (Allen 
& Kohut, 2006).  It seems that a plurality 
of Americans has noticed, “that in recent 
years only the most affluent workers have 
experienced real gains in wages” (Allen, 
2007) and are now dissatisfied with the 
overall state of the economy. 
  
In addition to increasing income inequal-
ity, reducing Americans’ confidence in 
their national economy, supply side eco-
nomics has failed to produce the promised 
economic growth and produced the largest 
government deficits in the history of the 
United States. Between 1982 and 1993 the 
average annual deficit constituted 4.3% of 
GDP, compared to a mere 0.1% under the 
Clinton administration and an overall his-
torical average of 1.2%. The presidential 
administrations from Harry Truman to 
Jimmy Carter managed to decrease annual 
debt as a percentage of GDP by 70.4%. 
The Reagan and Bush Sr. administrations, 
however, reversed this trend by increasing 
the annual deficit as percentage of GDP by 
23.6% (Aaron-Dine & Kogan, 2006). Not 
all deficits are, however, harmful to soci-
ety. Moderate deficit can actually help ad-
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vance public well-fare, especially when 
funds are used to invest in the public sec-
tor, such as through increased spending on 
education or infrastructure. Yet, the defi-
cits incurred during the 1980s were neither 
moderate nor incurred through investment 
in social services, but rather depriving 
government of revenue. These deficits 
reached “sufficiently high levels that the 
compounding of interest on the debt 
[caused] the debt to grow faster than the 
economy.” This trend can lead to a “debt 
explosion” where “debt would begin to 
grow explosively and threaten the func-
tioning of the economy” (Greenstein & 
Kogan, 1997). Overall, during the 1980s, 
supply-side economics drove the U.S. 
government into debt at a potentially dev-
astating pace. 
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Figure 4. Percent of respondents evaluating the economy as being in good shape by parti-
san affiliation and gross annual household income (Allen & Kohut, 2006). 
 
When government is deprived of funds 
and forced to pay an increasing share of its 
reduced revenue on debt repayment and 
interest, social services suffer. The cost of 
foregoing investment in the social sector 
in order to pay for tax cuts bestowed upon 
the rich is unacceptable. The condition of 
America’s infrastructure is a prime exam-
ple. The American Society of Civil Engi-
neers (ASCE) gives U.S. infrastructure a 
grade of D, with drinking water and waste 
water facilities being given a D minus. 
The association estimates that $1.6 trillion 
are needed over the next five years to re-
pair the nation’s physical plant. According 
to the ASCE, “Congested highways, over-
flowing sewers and corroding bridges are 
constant reminders of the looming crisis 
that jeopardizes our nation's prosperity and 
our quality of life” (ASCE, 2007). The 
cost of repairing “obsolete or deteriorating 
bridges” alone amounts to $7.4 billion per 
year. The main cause of this “looming cri-
sis” is easy to locate: reduced spending. In 
the late 1950s to early 1970s, the U.S. 
spent over 2% of GDP on infrastructure, 
compared to roughly 1% of GDP since the 
early 1980s (Author, Author & Author, 
2007). Supply-side economics has reduced 
tax revenue and increased debt. Therefore, 
the funding of important government ser-
vices, such as maintaining the nation’s 
physical plant, have suffered. 
Despite the letdown of supply-side eco-
nomics and the grave need for increased 
government revenue, the Bush administra-
tion has decided to ignore the lessons of 
history and revive the economic policies 
of the 1980s. Ignored are the successes of 
the Clinton administration, which raised 
the top marginal tax rate by 27.5%, bal-
anced four consecutive budgets and low-
ered poverty rates to levels not seen since 
the 1970s. Ignored is the legacy of the 
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1980s as a decade of greed and injustice 
(Ehrenreich, 1989). Ignored is the scien-
tific consensus among economists that 
supply-side economics are an utter and 
complete failure (Chait, 2007a). The brief 
revival of fiscal responsibility, social jus-
tice and progressive taxation of the 1990s 
has been replaced by the dated 
Reaganesque supply-side dogma of the 
political right-wing. Before Bush signed 
the 2003 tax cuts into law, ten Nobel price 
laureates, George Akerlof, Kenneth J. Ar-
row, Franco Modigliani, Paul A. 
Samuelson, Douglas C. North, Lawrance 
R. Klein, Robert M. Sollow, William F. 
Sharpe, Daniel L. McFadden, and Joseph 
Stiglitz signed the “Economists’ Statement 
Opposing The Bush Tax Cuts.” The 2003 
statement reads: 
....Overcapacity, corporate scandals, and 
uncertainty have and will continue to 
weigh down the economy. 
 
The tax cut plan proposed by President 
Bush is not the answer to these problems. 
Regardless of how one views the specifics 
of the Bush plan, there is wide agreement 
that its purpose is a permanent change in 
the tax structure and not the creation of 
jobs and growth in the near-term. The 
permanent dividend tax cut, in particular, 
is not credible as a short-term stimulus... 
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Figure 5. Annual percentage growth in GDP, number of paid jobs, personal income and 
consumption was below average for the 2001 to 2005 business cycle (Author, 2005). 
 
Passing these tax cuts will worsen the 
long-term budget outlook, adding to the 
nation’s projected chronic deficits. This 
fiscal deterioration will reduce the capac-
ity of the government to finance Social 
Security and Medicare benefits as well as 
investments in schools, health, infrastruc-
ture, and basic research. Moreover, the 
proposed tax cuts will generate further 
inequalities in after-tax income... 
The Bush tax cuts epitomize the dra-
matic flaws of supply-side economics and 
the dire predications of the ten Nobel price 
laureates have come true. The Bush tax 
cuts have cost roughly $1.2 trillion be-
tween 2001 and 2006 (Fielder & Kogan, 
2006). “Proponents of these tax cuts prom-
ised stronger economic gains than were 
typical of the past, but that did not occur” 
(Price & Ratner, 2005). With the sole ex-
ception of the housing market, economic 
performance has been below average since 
the Bush administration started manipulat-
ing the tax code in 2001 (see figure 5). Be-
tween 2001 and 2005, GDP growth was 
17.6% below average, while GDI (Gross 
8
Culture, Society, and Praxis, Vol. 7, No. 1 [2008], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.csumb.edu/csp/vol7/iss1/2
CS&P Brendel 9   
 
 Culture Society and Praxis   
 
Domestic Income) growth was 36% below 
average. The number of jobs created grew 
by only 6.5%, 28.5% below the average 
growth rate of 9.1%. The growth in aver-
age salaries was less than half as usual; 
1.2% versus 2.7%, respectively. While 
growth in consumer spending was 72% 
faster than growth in income, it too has 
“failed to keep pace with the... average of 
previous cycles.” Only investment residen-
tial real-estate soared, growing 26% faster 
than average, creating the now infamous 
housing bubble. “A review of economic 
performance over the last four-and-a-half 
years indicates that the series of major tax 
cuts enacted in that time have not 
strengthened the economy. Almost every 
broad measure of economic activity... has 
fared worse over the last four-and-a-half 
years than in past cycles” (Price, 2005). It 
is, therefore, clear that the Bush tax cuts 
have missed their objective. 
What has ballooned as a result of the 
Bush tax cuts is the national deficit (see 
figure 6). While in 2001 the “Congres-
sional Budget Office projected budget sur-
pluses of $5.6 trillion from 2002 to 2011... 
[by 2003 it projected] hundreds of billions 
of dollars in deficits over the same period” 
(Gale & Orszag, 2003). The Bush tax cuts 
have been the single largest contributor to 
the $1.8 trillion the government borrowed 
between 2001 and 2007; their cost com-
prising 51% of increased debt. On Sep-
tember 30, 2007, U.S. public debt was 
clocked at $5.1 trillion, up 54% from $3.3 
trillion in October 2001 (U.S. Treasury, 
2007). The Bush administration received 
ample warning that its tax cuts would cre-
ate fiscal nightmare, as “even President 
Bush's own Council of Economic Advi-
sors has written that the tax cuts would 
make the budget deficit worse.” The Bush 
tax cuts are a “huge fiscal gamble... [that] 
burdens... future generations” (Gale & Or-
szag, 2003). In sight of the cost of baby-
boomers starting to accept their entitle-
ments and a war that will likely cost $2.7 
trillion (Reuters, 2007), increasing the 
deficit through tax cuts for the rich is sim-
ply “reckless” (Gale & Orszag, 2003). The 
Bush administration’s approach to fiscal 
policy may be best described as quitting 
one’s job before purchasing a brand new 
Mercedes-Benz. 
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Figure 6. Public debt in billions from January 2001 to September 2007, showing an in-
crease of roughly 54% (Author, 2007). 
 
9
Brendel: Supply-Side Fallacy
Published by Digital Commons @ CSUMB, 2008
 CS&P Vol 7. Num 1  Spring 2008 
The Bush tax cuts have exemplified the 
flawed nature of supply-side economics. 
Yet, “every Republican candidate running 
for president in 2008 has pledged that the 
tax cuts President Bush pushed through 
Congress... should continue indefinitely” 
with additional promise to “never to allow 
income taxes to increase...” (Redburn, 
2007). While the tax rates of the 1940s, 
50s, 60s and 70s may have theoretically 
inhibited economic growth (though the 
economic grew strongly in spite of them), 
the current top marginal tax rate is too 
low, needlessly depriving government of 
revenues. These funds are, however, 
needed to expand and improve social ser-
vices, repair the rapidly deteriorating in-
frastructure and prepare for the flood of 
entitlement claims that will ensue once 
baby-boomers start retiring. Cutting taxes 
of the rich has failed to produce the eco-
nomic growth it promised, ballooned na-
tional debt and increased income inequal-
ity. 
Coming November 2008, the American 
public will have the opportunity to end 
supply-side economics, reduce income 
inequality and give government the access 
to funds it desperately needs to serve the 
American people. It is time to repeal the 
Bush tax cuts, which have already cost us 
$1.2 trillion, not counting the opportunity 
cost of withholding funds from social ser-
vices. It is time that the public and policy 
makers listen to economists. It is time to 
prepare for the future, restore social justice 
and revive fiscal responsibility. It is time 
to discard supply-side economics as the 
rubbish it is and free the White House 
from failed rightist economic dogma.  
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